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Effectively managing the Navy Flight Hour Program (FHP) has historically posed 
unique challenges.  Most notably, CNAF FHP managers have routinely faced a 
seemingly unavoidable shortfall in flight hour funding thus requiring the use of creative 
cash management practices and reliance on defense supplemental appropriations to 
continue flight operations to the end of each fiscal year.  In an effort to reduce this 
disparity between budget forecasts and actual program execution requirements, 
significant changes were recently made to individual pricing models used in formulating 
OP-20 funding levels (Flying Hour Program Budget Exhibit).  In addition, the Navy’s 
transition to the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) in support of the overall Fleet 
Response Plan (FRP) in July of 2003 resulted in a fundamental shift in funding 
requirements and overall program execution. 
The purpose of this research is twofold in nature.  First, the authors’ aim is to 
provide new FHP administrators a single-source document that summarizes the 
underlying build of each funding element contained in the OP-20.  Second, is to analyze 
what effect the response to the fundamental shift in the Navy’s overall readiness posture 
had on the ability of program administrators to match budgeted program dollars with 
execution requirements.  The methodology for this research will entail an analysis into 
the specific changes to the OP-20 budgeting models and their effect on funding level 
accuracy and execution, along with a review of the resulting execution changes 
implemented at Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) in support of the new 
FRP.  Additionally, the study utilizes a comparison of the budget formulation process and 
program execution in FY02 and FY05 to highlight any observed efficiencies or 
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The dawning of the 21st century witnessed one of the most dramatic 
transformations in U.S. military history.  In line with the fundamental shift in military 
thinking following the fall of the Soviet Union, the realities of a new world order 
dominated by asymmetric threats and adversaries have forced a profound restructuring of 
America’s armed forces.  As a result, every service faces an increased challenge of 
demonstrating the value of each of its war-fighting components and ultimately validating 
their claim to a portion of the Defense Department’s budget. 
As one of these war-fighting components, Naval aviation now finds itself at a 
pivotal crossroads in reaffirming its vital contribution to America’s war-fighting effort.  
The lack of an immediate peer competitor in the air-to-air arena along with the mere 
nature of recent operations, with their reduced reliance on Naval air support, creates a 
challenging environment that mandates a substantial and effective lobbying effort in 
highlighting where Naval aviation fits into a more streamlined force structure.  The 
ability to demonstrate effectively and accurately the contribution Naval aviation brings to 
the fight is paramount to securing a fair share of valuable and limited defense dollars.  In 
addition to adequately articulating the community’s vital role in America’s 21st century 
military, Naval leadership, specifically Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) and 
supporting Air Type Commanders (Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific, Commander 
Naval Air Forces Atlantic), faces an equally important task of effectively executing every 
last dollar of appropriated funds.  Due to the realities of congressionally appropriated 
resources, accurate and justified expenditure of defense dollars today carries tremendous 
weight in the allocation of these same funding levels tomorrow.  To achieve this goal, 
therefore, sound budgeting and subsequent execution of Naval aviation’s monetary 
vehicle, the Flight Hour Program (FHP), is paramount to the sustained well-being of what 
this community’s advocates believe to be an indispensable component of the U.S. 
military. 
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B. REASONS FOR CHANGE 
“The current operational readiness of the U.S. military is dependant on the 
viability of the O&M account.  This account is often the target for budget cuts in order to 
fund other programs.”1  The reasons are primarily two-fold.  First, the account is a more 
desirable target when facing current year fiscal challenges due to the fact the O&M funds 
are single-year funds, so a cut this year has an immediate dollar for dollar impact on any 
current fiscal challenges.  Conversely, only a percentage of cuts to multiyear accounts 
such as R&D or procurement will have an effect on the fiscal challenges of the current 
year.2
Second, the O&M appropriation is an easy target because it is difficult to defend 
the full amount budgeted.  The challenge arises from the fact that a significant portion of 
FHP dollars purchase readiness, which is a difficult end item to quantify.  For example, 
what is the degradation to readiness caused by a $5 million cut to the FHP?  How do you 
connect a dollar reduction in the FHP budget to a specific degradation in readiness?  
These are just a few of the difficult questions routinely faced by Congress and FHP 
managers. 
Additionally, there is little interest in Congress to defending the O&M account.  If 
a reduction to the manpower account occurs, representatives in Congress from the district 
where the personnel reductions materialize rise to the defense.  If an aircraft procurement 
account suffers a cut, representatives from the districts with businesses affected by the cut 
will rise to the defense.  If CNAP’s FHP is cut by 5 percent, who in Congress will rise to 
the defense? 
Focusing on an appropriation that is a prime target for raiding, the POM-04 
Baseline Assessment Memorandum (BAM) for the FHP identified five important 
emerging issues in January of 2002: 
 
1 Phillips, William E., Flying Hour Program Cash Management at Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific.  Masters 
Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2001.  p. 6.
2 McCaffery, Jerry and Mutty, John E., “The Hidden Process of Budgeting:  Execution,” Journal of Public 
Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management, Summer 1999, p. 239.
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“(a) The increasing cost of operating an aging fleet of aircraft is testing the limits 
of our ability to achieve desired readiness goals.”3
(b) OPNAV has an ongoing concern into the validity of the Joint TYCOM 
Training and Readiness Instruction on which the FHP bases training requirements.4
(c) A historically significant difficulty exists in articulating the readiness 
contribution provided by simulators.5
(d) The current balance of other resources may limit execution of the full flight 
hour requirement, which “. . . is the desired peacetime training posture that supports 
peacetime sustained operations and provides the surge capability to support the full intent 
of DPG.”6  [Defense Planning Guidance] 
(e) The un-validated Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) submission is a 
significant portion of the Flying Hour Support (FO) account (approximately 26%).  
Failure to articulate true NMCI requirements may lead to under funding of the FO 
account.7
In addition to the emerging issues, the POM-04 BAM stated the following goals 
for improving specific areas of the FHP: 
A. FLYING HOURS.  The goal of the PR-03 FHP Working Group 
was to propose a methodology to determine a readiness based flying hour 
requirement; one in which Hours/Crew/Month (H/C/M) correlated to a 
specific T-rating (level of readiness) and in turn could be linked to support 
of Warfighting Policy.8  (Figure 1) 
 
3 Memorandum from Commander Naval Air Forces (N43) to Director, Assessment Division (N81) of 15 Jan 02, 
Subject:  Program Objective Memorandum (POM-04) Fleet Readiness Division Baseline Assessment Memorandum 
(BAM),  p. 1. 
4 Ibid., p. 2. 
5 Ibid., p. 3. 
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
7 Ibid., p. 3. 
8 Ibid., Enclosure (1) p. 5. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Link Between Required Training Missions and War-fighting Policy9 
 
B. FLYING HOUR SUPPORT (FO).  Another purpose of this BAM 
is to clearly and accurately capture future FO requirements.  Clarity of 
what FO is “buying” will allow validation of the requirement and make it 
defendable throughout the PPBS process.  A rigorous challenge was aimed 
at all major claimants to ensure thorough validity of requirement 
submissions. 
C. FLIGHT HOUR COST.  The increasing cost of operating our fleet 
of aircraft is testing the limit of our ability to achieve required readiness 
goals.  A major goal of this BAM is to incorporate more advanced 
modeling into flight hour cost projections and provide increased visibility 
to the components of the cost per hour that are accelerating at 
unacceptable rates.  The ultimate goal of the POM-04 process should be to 
enable Naval aviation leadership to identify and implement efficiency 
improvements that will control the escalating cost of readiness. 
D. SIMULATOR CONTRIBUTION.  There has been significant 
difficulty in articulating the readiness contribution provided by simulators.  
This BAM will discuss the current contribution of simulators, shortfalls 
that prohibit increased fleet utilization of current simulators, and potential 
benefits of the Fleet Advanced Simulation and Training (FAST) plan. 
E. READINESS POSTURES.  Support of promulgated Defense 
Planning Guidance . . . is the basis for the number of flight hours required 
in . . . this assessment.10
                                                 
9 Ibid., Enclosure (1) p. 6. 
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In line with the aforementioned effort by CNAF to effectively address these 
emerging issues and ultimately fulfill the stated goals, significant changes to the 
budgeting and execution process of the program materialized.  Both in terms of altering 
operational execution to better align itself with DOD’s newly structured defense posture, 
to implementing improvements to specific budgeting elements, the FHP now represents a 
more accurate assessment of Naval aviation requirements.  Though still in their infancy, 
these enhancements can only serve to improve the bargaining power of the program for 
future defense dollars. 
 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is twofold in nature.  First, the authors’ aim is to 
provide new FHP administrators, active duty and civilian, a single-source document that 
summarizes the underlying build of each funding element contained in the OP-20.  The 
authors’ belief is that by raising awareness of funding level formulation and the 
interdependence existing between each office administering a particular segment of the 
FHP, an overall improvement in efficiency and budget execution may occur.  Second, the 
research will provide an analysis of recent changes to the budgeting process and 
subsequent execution of program requirements.  Specifically, the study entails a 
comparative examination of CNAP’s FY02 and FY05 FHP to highlight program changes 
following the Navy’s FY03 transition to the FRP and concurrent implementation of OP-
20 pricing model changes.  Through a comparison of the two fiscal years, insight into 
whether these changes resulted in an improvement in program efficiencies and execution 
comes into view.  Furthermore, the intrinsically dynamic nature that exists in the overall 
budget formulation and execution of the FHP warrants a periodic resetting of the 




10 Ibid., Enclosure (1) p. 6. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The body of the project addresses the following research questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
Have the changes to the budgeting models, execution, and procedural methods of 
CNAF’s annual FHP improved the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the program at 
CNAP? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What specific changes did OPNAV make to the FHP budgeting models and 
execution methods? 
b. Have improvements in cost and readiness materialized due to these changes? 
c. From the view of stakeholders11, have these changes proven beneficial, 
detrimental, ineffective, or a combination of the above? 
d. How has implementation of the Navy’s FRP affected the budgeting and 
execution process of the FHP? 
e. Do further changes to the budgeting models or execution methods of the 
program warrant consideration? 
 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this study primarily entails an analysis of the FHP as constructed 
for, and executed within CNAP; however, utilization of data from Naval Air Forces 
Atlantic facilitates drawing conclusions across all of CNAF.  The two primary sources of 
research data came from personal interviews with FHP administrators and budget 
analysts at the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N432D and CNAP, along 
with the review of various FHP publications and documents to include, but not limited to: 
FY02 and FY05 Execution OP-20s; CNAP Flight Hour Cost Reports (FHCRs); OPNAV 
FHP Data Call Memorandums; and data products from CNAF’s Aviation Financial 
 
11 Stakeholders to include - OPNAV, CNAF, TYCOMS, individual squadrons and aircrew. 
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Analysis Tool (AFAST) and Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System (CAVTS) 
website. 
Three studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) focusing on the 
escalating Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) and Maintenance consumable 
(AFM) costs and associated drivers provided the majority of data for changes to the 
funding of program maintenance elements.  Additionally, information from the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) CAVTS website in conjunction with AFAST data 
highlighted program cost drivers, trends and actual execution of the FY02 and FY05 
FHP. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The study contains five chapters. 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the study that includes a section on 
background, purpose, scope and methodology and a statement of primary and secondary 
research questions. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the funding composition of the OP-20.  
Specific sections include discussion of the Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO or OFC-01) 
expense account and the Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM or OFC-50) account.  
Each account is further broken down into its individual Special Interest Category as 
reported in the OP-20 (FF/fuel, FA/DLR, FM/maintenance, FW/Contract, and 
FO/Support). 
Chapter III provides an examination of the FHP budgetary process.  This chapter 
discusses the budgetary process as of FY05, the changes that transpired with the program 
since FY02, the effectiveness of these changes, and any remaining concerns.  As with 
Chapter II, the study examines the two primary cost accounts and individual funding 
categories as presented in the OP-20. 
Chapter IV provides an examination of the FHP execution process.  This chapter 
discusses the execution of the program as of FY05, the changes that transpired with the 
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program since FY02, the effectiveness of these changes, and any remaining concerns.  
This chapter looks primarily at the impact of the Navy's transition to the Fleet Readiness 
Training Plan in support of the overall Fleet Response Plan. 
Chapter V provides conclusions, a summary of answers to the primary and 
secondary research questions, and recommendations for future areas of study. 
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II. OP-20 FUNDING COMPOSITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The OP-20 is a Department of the Navy (DON) planning document published by 
OPNAV N432D12 that serves as the primary budgeting and execution guidance for the 
Navy’s FHP.  The document establishes budgeted funding levels for individual program 
elements on a cost per hour and total annual expenditure basis for each of the supporting 
Budget Submitting Offices (BSO):  Commander Atlantic Fleet, Commander Pacific 
Fleet, Commander Naval Forces Europe, and Commander Naval Reserve Forces.  The 
document is further broken down into the three primary mission areas comprising Naval 
aviation:  Tactical Air/Anti-Submarine Warfare (TACAIR/ASW); Fleet Air Support 
(FAS); and Fleet Air Training (FAT).  The separate program funding elements provided 
in the OP-20 represent each of the individual funding codes contained in the 
corresponding AFO and AOM expense accounts.  The OP-20 then assigns a Special 
Interest Category (SIC) designation to each funding code as follows: 
Funding Code    Special Interest Category 
 7B     FF/Fuel 
 9S     FA/DLR 
 7L/7F13    FM/Maint 
FW/Contracts 
      FO/Support 
OPNAV utilizes the Fleet Readiness Division (N43) to formulate dollar amounts for each 
program SIC by means of the FHP requirements and pricing models.  The document 
provides both cost per hour and annual cost figures (in millions).  Figure 2 presents an 
illustrative portion of an execution OP-20 with associated headings and funding level 
                                                 
12 Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division. 
13 7F funding is provided under the OP-20 SIC "FM" which falls under the AOM (OFC-50) expense account.  For 
TYCOM accounting purposes, 7F funds fall under the AFO (OFC-01) expense account. 
elements for all F-14Ds assigned to CNAP.  Chapter III will provide discussion into the 
funding formulation for each of the individual SICs. 
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Figure 2.  
                                                
 FY2005 Execution OP-2014 
 




U. S. PACIFIC FLEET   Department of the Navy OP-20 
   Analysis of Navy Flying Budget BackUp Exhibit 
FY:  2005 
 
Version: 1664 05- -82 -EX (EXECUTION OP-20) 
 
GEN PURPOSE FORCES  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Cost Per Hour - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
           - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Annual Cost, in Millions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Program                 Hrly Fuel 
Element       TMS     Forces   Util    Hours   FF/Fuel   FA/DLR   FM/Maint  FW/Contract  FO/Other  ADJ   Total   Cons Rate  
 
02 06134 M  FA-18D    36.0  29.461 12727   1577.14    2726.93     940.66          157.24            0.00      0.00  5401.97   27.611 
                        20.072      34.706     11.972            2.001          0.000    0.000    68.751 
B. (OFC-1) AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS (AFO) 
The AFO cost account is one of two squadron Operating Targets (OPTARS) 
expense accounts.  The AFO funding consists of two funding codes 7B (fuel) and 7F 
(administrative and flight equipment). 
1. (FF/fuel) 7B 
The 7B account primarily pays for fuel and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) 
consumed during flight operations.  7B funds only comprise approximately 17% of the 
FHP.15  The amount of 7B funds directly tie to the number of flight hours budgeted.  The 
OP-20 accounts for these funds under the FF/Fuel SIC.  The squadron reports expenses 
using monthly FHCRs and Budget OPTAR Reports (BORs). 
 
14 FY05 Department of the Navy OP-20, Version 1664 05-82 Execution OP-20, 18 October 2004, p. 13.  




                                                
2. (Administrative and Flight Equipment) 7F 
The 7F account pays for administrative items and flight equipment used in the 
operations of aircraft.  This includes items such as authorized flight clothing and 
operational equipment, consumable office supplies, liquid and gaseous oxygen, and 
special identification clothing and personal protection equipment used by personnel for 
the launch and recovery of aircraft.  The squadron reports expenses against this account 
in the monthly BOR. 
 
C. (OFC-50) AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE (AOM) 
1. (FA/DLR) Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) 
AVDLRs are typically high cost items that require repair at the depot level or at 
the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) once determined to be Beyond the 
Capability of Maintenance (BCM) at an Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA).  The 
Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) finances AVDLRs where the end user (squadron) 
finances the depot level repair and procurement to replace the BCM, lost, or missing 
components.  The squadron monthly BOR submissions list AVDLR expenses under fund 
code 9S.  Though squadrons usually initiate AVDLR demands, the local IMA determines 
whether the transaction will result in an AVDLR NWCF charge.  Consequently, the air 
station or local IMA retains control of the AVDLR funds and corresponding accounting 
responsibilities.  The OP-20 reflects AVDLRs under Special Interest Category “FA” and 
is part of the total FHP cost per hour calculation.16
2. (FM/maint) Consumables (AFM) 
Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) funding, or “consumables,” finances less 
expensive items used in the support of flight operations.  Used for both organizational 
and intermediate level maintenance functions, funding occurs for the procurement of 
consumable parts, materials, tools, lubricants and services to repair aircraft, support 
equipment, or aeronautical components.  Similar to AVDLR reporting, monthly BOR 
 
16 Marine Corps Order (MCO)  3125.1A, 
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/AVN/MCO31251A/FHP%20encl%209%20Glossary%20V2.0.doc, 15 March 2005, p. 
9-2. 
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submissions report AFM expenses for each squadron under fund code 7L.  The OP-20 
reflects AFM costs under the SIC “FM” and is part of the total FHP cost per hour 
calculation.  In addition to funding for maintenance consumable items, the OP-20 
incorporates 7F expenditures into the “FM” category.  For accounting purposes at the 
TYCOM level, 7F funding falls under the AFO (OFC-01) account.17
3. FW/Contract 
Contract maintenance involves the outsourcing of aircraft maintenance and 
support services to civilian or NWCF activities to support squadron operations when 
military personnel or equipment are not available or determined not to be as economical 
as a Contract Field Team (CFT).  Both fleet commands and NAVAIR have the authority 
to write and approve contracts while TYCOMs maintain financial management 
responsibility.  Total costs include fixed and variable cost estimates.  Program fixed costs 
obligate funds regardless of hours flown, while projected squadron flight hours determine 
variable costs.  Contract maintenance is seen as SIC “FW” on the OP-20 and is part of the 
cost per hour calculation.18
 
D. FO (FO/SUPPORT) 
The Funding Support, also known as Funding Other, category primarily 
represents outlays for indirect expenses supporting aircraft operations and training.  At 
CNAP, the accounts that fall under this category include: 
• Squadron/Staff TAD 
• Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) 
• Transportation of Things (TOT) 
• Operational Staffs (Wing/Staff civilian labor/materials) 
• Staff/Fleet Automated Data Processing (ADP) support 
• Commercial Air Services (CAS) 
• Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group (FASOTRAGRU) 
• Fleet Simulators Support 
• Air Traffic Control Squadrons (MATCALS/ATC) 
• Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC) 
 
17 Ibid., p. 9-2. 
18 Ibid., p. 9-3. 
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• TACAMO ("Take Charge And Move Out") - 
COMSTRATCOMMWINGONE Tinker AFB OK 
• Miscellaneous Support19 
 
The FO expenses are not specifically squadron expenses but are an integral part of 
the overall cost of the FHP.  However, the OPNAV N432D programs no funds into the 
OP-20 for FO requirements. 
 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 15
                                                
III. OP-20 BUDGETING PROCESS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The formulation of the FY05 FHP budget maintains much of the same underlying 
construction as that of FY02.  However, in an effort to improve matching budgeted 
funding levels with execution requirements, OPNAV implemented a number of key 
enhancements in FY03.  Specifically, the program witnessed changes to the existing 
pricing models used in the formulation of OP-20 funding levels along with the maturation 
of the web-based cost adjustment and tracking system.  The need for these changes 
surfaced primarily due to two factors.  First, in response to the transformational initiatives 
mandated by the Secretary of Defense, a more accurate and justifiable program budget 
was essential in order for CNAF to better align itself with the military’s new streamlined 
and cost efficient force structure.  Furthermore, the Navy's recently mandated shift in its 
readiness posture resulted in a fundamental shift in the operational execution and 
subsequent funding of Naval aviation requirements.  Second, CNAF’s continual, yet 
unavoidable, over-execution of program funding due to non-recurring expenses in 
support of current operations (Operations Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom), along with 
escalating maintenance-related costs, necessitates closer scrutiny of the budgeting 
process.  Both in the areas of flight operations and aircraft maintenance, historic budget 
shortfalls required creative cash management practices to support operations adequately.  
The necessity to fulfill operational requirements despite an inadequate funding level 
resulted frequently in program managers ignoring long-term ramifications20 to satisfy 
current needs.  This practice merely exacerbated the budgeting and execution problems 
experienced by the program in follow-on fiscal years.  Consequently, improvements to 
the process became essential. 
 
 
 20 Self-imposed program over execution in first quarter of each subsequent fiscal year and an inability to 
accurately justify future funding requirements to OPNAV. 
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B. GATHERING DATA 
CNO, Fleet Readiness Division gathers data used to formulate the FHP budget by 
sending out a data call message in October of each FY.  This message requests data from 
various sources involved in the FHP, including CNAP.  The various sources send the 
requested data in a specific format by a specific date.  The specific data requested from 
CNAF for development of the PR-07 FHP included the following: 
TACAIR
• The 100% static T&R matrix sortie requirement for each TACAIR TMS, 
on an annual basis.  Additionally, provide an electronic version of the 
most recent T&R Instruction that reflects this data. 
• The FRP IDRC profile average (not considering simulator utilization) for 
each of the FYDP (GNFPP) for FY06-07, notional FRP for FY08-11) for 
CVW, FDNF, HSL, Expeditionary VAQ, Expeditionary VFA, and VP. 
• The Equivalent Sortie Length (ESL) for each TACAIR TMS. 
• The percentage of the total sortie requirements that are projected to be 
completed in simulators for each TMS for FY06 through FY11. 
• The number of staff aviators, by TMS, and the sorties/crew/month (as a 
percentage of T&R) for which to budget for those aviators. 
• The support sortie/flight hour requirement for each TACAIR TMS as a 
percentage of the training sortie/flight hour requirement.21 
Fleet Air Training 
• Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) sortie/flight hour 
requirements by TMS and Mission Category.  Justification and 
explanation of each mission category.  If STRIKE requirements still exist, 
a detailed explanation of the purpose of those requirements, along with an 
                                                 
21 Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N43) of 8 Oct 2004, Subject:  Data 
Call in Support of the Flying Hour Program (FHP) Capabilities Plan (CP) Development for PR-07, p. 2-4. 
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explanation of the accounting process used to report the execution of those 
hours.22 
Fleet Air Support 
• Comments regarding any specific discrepancies of the most recent FY’s 
executed FAS aircraft utilization rates.23 
All Schedules 
• Certified FHCR. 
• Additional data regarding non-recurring FM costs. 
• New and updated cost adjustment sheets. 
• Contract maintenance requirements. 
• Reviewed FO requirements with associated justification.24 
Upon receipt of all requested data, the Fleet Readiness Division incorporates the 
information into the FHP Requirements Model to establish program-funding levels.  The 
primary source of information used in the following sections comes from the FHP Model 
Pricing Validation Team at CNO Fleet Readiness Division (N43). 
 
C. FHP REQUIREMENTS MODEL 
The FHP Requirements Model, shown in Figure 3, is the method OPNAV N432 
developed to project future year flight hour requirements.  The heart of the FHP 
Requirements Model requires “. . .  specific validated data input elements to generate a 
valid flying hour requirement for input into the Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS).  
The FHPS combines this data with cost data to produce a Flying Hour Program Budget 
Exhibit (OP-20).  The FHPS develops the requirement in four distinct schedules 
(modules):  Schedule A (TACAIR); Schedule B (Fleet Air Training); Schedule C (Fleet 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 5.   
23 Ibid., p. 5. 
24 Ibid., p. 6-9. 
Air Support); and Schedule D (Reserves).”25  Analysts enter data gathered from the data 
call message and monthly FHCRs into the FHPS to forecast future funding requirements. 













USN TACAIR T&R Matrix
Marine Aviation Campaign Plan
Readiness
Model
Fleet Air Support T&R Matrix 
Reserves T&R Requirements
Crew / Seat Ratio 
FHP Requirements Model
NSAWC 
Schedule A - TACAIR
Schedule B – FAT/FRS
Schedule C – FAS
Schedule D – RESERVES
Aircrew Manning Factor (AMF)
 
Figure 3.  
                                                
 Detailed Portion of FHPS Used to Calculate Hours26 
 
The FHPS has two major parts.  One part, detailed in Figure 3, determines the 
flight hours required by schedule for any aviation unit.  The second part, represented by 
the circled box in Figure 3 and shown in detail in Figure 4, calculates the total cost per 
hour for any TMS by summing the results of the individual TMS costs per hour for 
AVDLR, maintenance and consumables, fuel, and contract maintenance.  Multiplying the 
hours from part one by the total cost per hour from part two yields the funding 
requirement for each unit.  Calculating and summing the results for every aviation unit 
results in the total FHP requirement in dollars. 
 
25 Ibid., p. 1. 
26 Darling, Robert, LtCol. (N432D), Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N43) Brief, "Model 
Pricing Validation Team:  Flying Hour Program," 16 March 2005, slide 3. 
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Figure 4.  
                                                
 Detailed Potion of FHPS Used to Calculate CPH27 
 
Units funded by the FHP fall under four schedules shown in Figure 3, the first 
three of which apply to CNAP:  A) TACAIR (approximately 70 percent), B) FAT/FRS 
(approximately 20 percent), C) FAS (approximately six percent), and D) the Reserves 
(approximately four percent).  Schedule A uses a Readiness Model driven by the 
Readiness Goal, IDRC Profile, and T&R matrix to project flight hour requirements.  The 
Integrated Production Plan (IPP) drives most of the requirements for Schedule B.  
Although a similar Readiness Model based on T&R matrices and deployment plans is in 
development for Schedule C, it currently uses aircraft utilization rates consistent with 
historical execution rates as the baseline for flight hour requirements.  A similar T&R 
matrix based Active/Reserve Integrated plan is in development for Schedule D; however, 
 
27 Ibid., slide 4. 
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current inputs utilize the most recent information available on the anticipated outcome of 
the integration plan. 
 
D. PROJECTING HOURS FOR SCHEDULE A:  TACAIR 
1. Current Process 
Navy TACAIR includes all CVW squadrons (except VRC) plus HSL, VP, 
and VFA/VAQ Expeditionary squadrons.  Marine Corps TACAIR 
includes all MAG squadrons with the exception of Fleet Replacement 
Squadrons (FRS).28
The Training and Readiness (T&R) matrices, defined in CNAF 3500.1 series 
instruction, establish the flight hour requirements for each Navy TACAIR 
type/model/series (TMS) to achieve specified readiness levels.  The model input for Navy 
TACAIR is one hundred percent of the static T&R matrix sorties for each TMS, on an 
annual basis.  This value is then multiplied by the Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle 
(IDRC) profile average, which uses a twelve-month fiscal year Global Naval Forces 
Presence Policy (GNFPP) snapshot to provide an annualized average for the first two 
fiscal years and the notional FRP profile average for the remaining years in the FYDP.  
This result then allows for the determination of total sortie requirements for each 
TACAIR TMS, which when multiplied by the equivalent sortie length (ESL), derives the 
total flight hours per TMS.29  Figure 5 shows a notional FRP IDRC profile. 
 
28 Ibid.  p. 2. 
29 Ibid.  p. 2.  
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Figure 5.  
                                                
 Notional FRP IDRC Profile30 
 
One factor used toward deriving the total number of crews for which to budget 
flight hours is the wartime crew/seat ratio (CSR).  The wartime CSR is the result of 
wartime manning levels divided by Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA).  The Aircrew 
Manning Factor (AMF) is the peacetime manning level divided by the wartime manning 
requirement.  The result of these inputs is the Authorized Crews on Board (ACOB), 
which is multiplied by the derived total flight hours per TMS output of the Readiness 
Model to achieve the projected training hours requirements for the each TMS. 
In addition to the projected training hours for each of ACOB, the FHPS adds a 
Mission Essential Support Hours (MESH) factor for each TMS.  MESH funding covers 
the cost of tanker flights, functional check flights, logistics flights, and other non-training 
flights.  The amount of MESH depends on the TMS, the deployed status, and period in 
 
 21
30 Commander Naval Forces Pacific Flying Hour Program staff member, “FHP Brief + FHP 101” E-mail, 07 February 
2005. 
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the Fleet Readiness Training Plan.  Some units such as HC, and VAW when deployed, 
spend a significant portion of hours supporting other units.  Whereas, VF and VFA units 
currently receive very little MESH because they do not provide support necessary for 
other units. 
The projected training hours and MESH hours comprise the total budgeted flight 
hour requirements for each TMS, however, the budget does not support cost of war 
(COW) funding needs.  The total budgeted flight hour requirements for each TMS 
multiplied by the various costs per hour of the FHP Pricing Model for FA, FM, FF, and 
FW yields the projections for the OP-20. 
2. What Has Changed and Why 
As previously stated, one of the significant changes to the budgeting process for 
the FHP is the method used to determine the number of flight hours required in the first 
part of the FHPS.  Subsequent sections will discuss changes to the second part of the 
FHPS as they pertain to the formulation of program costs per hour. 
In 2002, the T&R matrices changed from task-based matrices to primarily sortie-
based matrices.  This created a direct relationship from sorties to hours to dollars, where 
sorties flown is the main contributing factor to determining readiness.  It acknowledged 
the value of not just the various types of missions flown, but also the inherent readiness 
value derived from every hour of every flight event.  The sortie-based matrices “. . . 
significantly improve the ability to quantify the training requirements.”31
The current system treats almost every aspect of the FHP as a variable cost driven 
by flight hours, therefore, one of the most significant changes to the program is the 
method of determining the hours requirement.  In the past, aircraft utilization rates 
consistent with historical execution rates established the baseline from which to validate 
flight hour requirements.  The creation of a performance model through the FHPS is an 
attempt to validate the hour requirements for each TMS. 
 
31 Memorandum from Commander Naval Air Forces (N43) to Director, Assessment Division (N81) of 15 Jan 02, 
Enclosure (1) p. 26. 
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Not only have the T&R matrices changed by reducing the number of hours to 
achieve a certain readiness level, but also the system now incorporates lower readiness 
goals over the entire IDRC.  The FY05 budget lowers the average IDRC readiness goal 
from 1.7532 in FY03 to 2.5033 in FY05. 
3. Effectiveness of Changes 
Changing to a sortie-based readiness measurement system does create a strong 
and direct tie to the FHP requirements.  This tie creates a strong defense for requested 
funds and shows specific and direct effects of funding shortfalls on readiness.  Accepting 
the validity of the T&R matrices foundation creates an almost direct relationship between 
dollars required and readiness received.  The FHP now buys a specific level of readiness.  
It moves the haggling over the budget out of the analysts’ expertise in cost management 
and into the aviators’ expertise in accessing readiness. 
Now, any manipulation in readiness metrics or goals directly affects FHP funding.  
The combined effect of lowering the readiness goal and reducing the hours required to 
achieve 100 percent readiness is significant.  Table 1 is a comparison of the T&R 
matrices requirements for TACAIR.  The table compiles values taken from the Squadron 
Training and Readiness instructions34 for the appropriate period and the readiness goals 
as stated above.  The net effect of the T&R matrices changes and the readiness goals 
reduction reduces the median training hours for a TACAIR squadron to achieve the 
average IDRC goal from 20.4 to 15.8 hours—a 21 percent reduction.  The changes to the 
T&R matrices do not affect MESH hours.  Hence, the FY05 budget only reflects an 
overall reduction of 13 percent, from 22.1 to 19.2 hours35, of flight hours per crew per 
month over the entire FHP. 
 
32 Highlights of the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2003 Budget, 
https://dbweb.secnav.navy.mil/budbrief/Highlights_Book.html, 24 May 2005, p. 2-11. 
33 Highlights of the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2005 Budget, 
https://dbweb.secnav.navy.mil/budbrief/Highlights_Book.html, 24 May 2005,  p. 2-9. 
34  COMNAVAIRFOR INSTRUCTION 3500.1 and COMNAVAIRFOR INSTRUCTION 3500.1B. 
35 Highlights of the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2005 Budget, Table 8 p. 2-11. 
TMS
(CREW/MONTH)          100% Goal 100% Goal 100% Goal 100% Goal
VF VFA
Sorties 18.7 18.0 -3.7% -0.7
Hours 28.0 20.7 27.0 16.9 -3.6% -18.3% -1.0 -3.8
VAQ
Sorties 14.0 15.0 7.1% 1.0
Hours 24.0 17.7 22.5 14.1 -6.3% -20.6% -1.5 -3.6
VAW
Sorties 21.6 18.3 -15.1% -3.3
Hours 32.4 23.9 27.5 17.2 -15.1% -28.1% -4.9 -6.7
VS
Sorties 18.0 16.7 -7.4% -1.3
Hours 27.1 20.0 25.0 15.6 -7.7% -21.8% -2.1 -4.4
HS
Sorties 9.0 12.7 40.7% 3.7
Hours 27.0 19.9 25.3 15.8 -6.2% -20.5% -1.7 -4.1
HSL
Sorties 12.6 12.7 0.5% 0.1
Hours 27.7 20.4 25.3 15.8 -8.5% -22.5% -2.4 -4.6
VP
Sorties 8.3 8.0 -3.0% -0.3
Hours 35.8 26.4 34.4 21.5 -3.9% -18.6% -1.4 -4.9
Median Values for TACAIR
Sorties 14.0 15.0 -3% -0.3
Hours 27.7 20.4 25.3 15.8 -6% -21% -1.7 -4.4
FY2005
Comparison of TACAIR T&R Matrix Requirements







Change from FY03 to FY05
 
Table 1.   Net Effect of T&R Matrices Changes and Readiness Goal Reduction 
 
4. Remaining Concerns 
Reducing requirements to achieve a certain level of readiness or reducing the 
readiness goal has limited use as a method for managing budget constraints.  At a certain 
point, the reductions will have a noticeable affect on actual performance. 
Since the basic budget equation is hours required multiplied by CPH equals FHP 
funds required, any net reduction in the hour requirement will have a direct and 
significant effect on the funding needs of the program.  The concern, however, is have the 
readiness goals been lowered too far?  Unfortunately, the only true way to find out is in 
actual combat.  Just as in sports where the coaches must decide if their team is ready for 
game day, experienced Naval Aviators must determine whether a unit is ready for 
combat.  Also similar to sports, the necessary level of readiness varies relative to the 
opponent.  Success in actual combat against a poorly trained and equipped opponent will 
not ensure success when faced with confronting a more formidable opponent more equal 
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in size, resources, and technology.  The readiness goals must be set to prepare for combat 
against the nation’s greatest perceived threats. 
As mentioned above, only actual combat truly tests readiness levels.  Discovering 
poor performance due to readiness level reductions during combat is too late and can 
have serious consequences to our national security.  With the bar currently set at 2.50, a 
squadron at the average IDRC goal would be “operationally safe” but not “operationally 
(combat) ready” as defined by enclosure 4 of the Squadron Training and Readiness 
instruction.  Consequently, is the bar set too low? 
 
E. (OFC-1) AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS (AFO) 
1. 7B (FF/fuel) 
a. Current Process 
For each TMS, OPNAV calculates the fuel costs per hour (CPH) by 
multiplying the most recent fiscal years certified fuel consumption rates times the 
projected barrel prices published by OSD to determine fuel costs per hour (CPH).  The 
FHPS multiplies each TMS CPH by its projected hour requirement from the FHP 
Requirements Model to determine a total fuel budget in dollars. 
Certified fuel consumption data (most recent FY barrels per hour) 
X 
Projected Hours + MESH 
X 
Published barrel prices (OSD) 
= 
Projected fuel cost 
Of course, the accuracy of the model is only as good as the accuracy of the 
inputs to the model.  The projected flight hours are really the only “discretionary” 
variable in the equation.  The certified fuel consumption data and published barrel prices 
are non-controllable variables taken from other sources.  Granted one could argue the 
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accuracy of the certified fuel consumption data by attacking the accuracy of the method 
to log flight hours.  Almost all Navy aircraft have no mechanical or digital method of 
recording flight time or engine time, such as a Hobbs meter36.  The accurate recording of 
flight time lies solely with the aircrew entering the flight record data and is therefore 
subject to his or her judgment in recording such data.  Although separate entries are 
available on official flight records for individual engine times, the engine time is always 
assumed to equal the flight time, even though the engines are routinely run for longer 
periods of time during normal preflight, postflight, and maintenance procedures, which 
could result in extensive engine use without any documentation. 
b. What Has Changed and Why 
Other than the common change of the method used to determine required 
flight hours, OPNAV has not changed nor will likely change the method for budgeting 
fuel costs.  Unlike other aviation costs, fuel costs are almost a direct linear function of 
hours flown.  While one could argue that by using Hobbs meters on the engines or at least 
manually tracking engine times separately would provide more accurate fuel CPH rates 
for each TMS, the relatively small variation in historical fuel CPH rates shows that this is 
probably not cost effective for the specific purpose of projecting fuel costs.  The only 
other way of improving this area of the budgeting process would be to improve the 
accuracy of the projected costs per barrel.  Unless the government acquires a crystal ball 
or starts buying oil futures like some airlines, the likelihood of improving the accuracy of 
projected costs per barrel is unlikely. 
2. 7F (Administrative and Flight Equipment) 
As stated earlier, the current process of budgeting for 7F expenses lumps the 
amount into the FM  SIC.  The funding for 7F related items is insignificant in comparison 




36 Hobbs, now a division of Honeywell, is the preeminent manufacturer of elapsed time measurement devices 
used for logging engine time on private aircraft.  Because of their prominence in the market, any meter on an aircraft 
used to measure elapsed time is commonly referred to as a Hobbs meter even though it may be manufactured by 
another company similar to a facial tissue being referred to as a Kleenex even thought it may be manufactured by Puffs. 
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F. (OFC-50) AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE (AOM) 
The OFC-50 expense account encompasses over 80 percent of the direct flight 
hour costs of the FHP.37  Consequently, the need to assess accurately the funding 
requirement for this particular program element has traditionally been at the forefront of 
program manager's efforts.  The inherent uncertainty of maintenance costs, however, has 
prevented an accurate estimation of projected costs, which resulted in recurring funding 
shortfalls and the need for creative cash management practices.  In an effort to improve 
the process, certain program pricing models experienced significant changes to allow for 
a more accurate matching of budgeted program dollars with actual fleet requirements. 
1. (FA/DLR) Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) 
a. Current Process 
The FA/DLR pricing model utilizes four input variables in calculating the 
AVDLR cost per hour (by TMS) as presented in the OP-20.  The four variables include a 
Certified Actual Expenditure Cost per Hour, a CNA Demand Factor, any Forecasted 
Programmatic Adjustments as submitted through the Cost Adjustment and Visibility 
Tracking System (CAVTS), and a baseline Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment.  OPNAV 
N432D uses the following equation to project AVDLR costs per hour: 
Certified Actual Expenditures (Most recent FY cost per hour) 
X 
Demand Factor (CNA) 
+/- 
Forecast Programmatic Adjustments/Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System 
(CAVTS) 
X 
Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment  
 
37 CNAF Commander Naval Air Forces N422 Plans & Policy, "Squadron CO Cost-wise Guide", 2005, p. 10. 
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÷ 
Projected flight hours 
= 
Projected AVDLR cost per hour (by TMS) 
 
The Certified Actual Expenditure variable serves as a baseline for 
determining funding requirements and comes from the respective TYCOMs most recent 
Certified FHCR.  The requirement for a certified figure results in the use of two year old 
data since the prior years execution numbers do not get certified in time for incorporation 
into the subsequent  OP-20 calculation (FY05 AVDLR funding calculation uses FY03 
cost per hour data as its baseline).  This utilization of two-year old data, and its usage as a 
baseline figure for future funding levels, has proven to be a point of contention for some 
program managers.  The CNA demand factor is a multiplier that takes into account the 
Department’s aging aircraft inventory and the resulting increase in failure rates of major 
components.  The Forecast Programmatic Adjustment allows for adjustments to funding 
levels based on inputs from NAVAIR’s CAVTS web tool.  The Escalation Factor/Rate 
Adjustment is a cumulative Defense and Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) 
composite rate change used to adjust the cost per hour baseline.  Prior years accumulated 
operating results at individual NWCF activities drive the annual rate adjustments. 
b. What Has Changed and Why 
The AVDLR funding element has been the recipient of much attention by 
FHP budget analysts resulting from the overall escalating costs experienced by the FHP.  
As a result, OPNAV instituted two specific improvements aimed at more accurately 
identifying resource requirements.  First, NAVAIR created the Cost Adjustment and 
Visibility Tracking System (CAVTS) to help formalize the FHP budgeting process.  
Second, the aforementioned change to the AVDLR pricing estimation model evolved due 
to ongoing difficulties in accurately estimating FA funding requirements for each TMS. 
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The introduction of CAVTS in December 2001 was the result of several 
CNO Executive Boards aimed at improving the FHP budgeting process.  The system is a 
NAVAIR sponsored web site tool that allows established program teams to input issues 
that may either positively or negatively impact future FA/DLR, FM, FW or FO costs.  
The design of the system attempts to more effectively identify future Flying Hour 
Program (FHP) cost drivers, track actual execution, and improve the feedback 
mechanisms to better prepare and forecast future Flying Hour Program budgets.38  
Additionally, due to the ability of the system to provide a wide array of historical, current 
execution year and future year OP-20 budget and flight hour data, program managers can 
more effectively perform program trend analysis and subsequently provide more accurate 
budget requirement submissions. 
One key element contributing to the recognized success of the CAVTS 
web tool is through the use of Cost Adjustment Sheets.  Cost Adjustment Sheets serve 
two distinct purposes.  First, they highlight any unanticipated changes to Fleet expenses 
that have not been budgeted for due in part to the use of two-year old flight hour data as a 
budgetary baseline.  Prior to the CAVTS web tool, FHP budgets routinely neglected to 
account for many of these unforeseen cost increases or cost savings, which resulted in an 
inaccurate assessment of funding requirements.  Second, the submission of Cost 
Adjustment Sheets provides a forum for ongoing dialogue relating to the effects of 
programmatic changes occurring at the TMS level.  Examples of input submissions 
include Engine Reliability Initiatives, warranty expirations, maintenance process change, 
“Sunset” Plans, and unusual component or system degradation.  Though still a work in 
progress, the utilization of fleet initiated inputs is critical to incorporating key 
stakeholders into the budgeting process and ultimately allowing FHP budgeters to more 
realistically price each TMS cost per flight hour. 
Figures 6 and 7 are sample CAS submissions.  Both actions originated 
because of respective Fleet Class Desk program teams recognizing the potential for 
significant effects on FHP funding requirements.  Figure 6 illustrates the effects on FA 
 
38 Naval Air Systems Command CAVTS Homepage, http://logistics.navair.navy.mil/cavts/index.cfm, 24 May 
2005. 
funding levels resulting from a community wide E-2C Hawkeye generator replacement 
program.  As reflected in the Overall FHP Funding Impact (Delta) line, the E-2C Class 
Desk anticipates a projected $4.9 million cost savings through FY11. 
Version 4.1
T/M/S: APML Name/Code/Phone: 
Submitting PMA: IWST Name/Code/Phone: 
Fleet Class Desk Name/Code/Phone: 
Adjustment Category: 
System: WUC(s): 
NIIN(s): Material Support Date: 
Issue Description:
O&M $ (in Thousands) FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011
Flight Hour Basis for Estimates: 8,659                20,698                   28,301                   29,990                   29,990                   29,990                   29,990                   29,990                   
AVDLR (FA) As Is Cost: $251.1 $600.2 $820.7 $869.7 $869.7 $869.7 $869.7 $869.7
AVDLR (FA) To Be Cost: $43.3 $103.5 $141.5 $150.0 $150.0 $150.0 $150.0 $150.0
AVDLR Funding Impact (Delta): ($207.8) ($496.7) ($679.2) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8)
Consumables (FM) As Is Cost
Consumables (FM) To Be Cost
Consumables Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $
FHP Contract (FW) As Is Cost:
FHP Contract (FW) To Be Cost:
FHP Contract Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $
FHP Support (FO) As Is Cost
FHP Support (FO) To Be Cost
FHP Support Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $
Overall FHP Funding Impact (Delta) ($207.8) ($496.7) ($679.2) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8) ($719.8)
Other
Primary Investment Type: 
01-140-2298 (old), 01-241-0539 (neW) 1-Oct-02
Flying Hour Program Cost Adjustment Sheet
Input Costs Below in Thousands of FY2003 Budget Year Dollars.   Do NOT Inflate.
Reliability degradation
Jeff Lewis / (301)757-7202
Steve McFadden / (215)697-5460
E-2C / C-2A
PMA 231
60 KVA Generator 42111
Mark Stoops (LANT) / Peter Olep (PAC)
The new generator AVDLR cost is estimated at $5 / AC FHR, with a MFHB BCM of 2000 flight hours.  
FY2003$K  EPG 0020 & 0021 replace high risk "tired-iron" generators from the fleet, with new increased MTBF generator.  300 DERF funded generators began delivery in June 2003.  Aircraft projected to be 
equiped with updated generator:  FY04=53, FY05=81, FY
"To Be" FHP Requirement Basis  (Reliability, Repair Cost Assumptions, Implementation Cost Funding & Source…):
"As Is" FHP Requirement Basis (Reliability, Repair Cost Assumptions, ...):
The generator current AVDLR cost is $29 / AC FHR, with a MFHB BCM of 553 flight hours.













Cost Estimating Basis:    
FIXED COST
VARIABLE COST (USAGE BASED)
EXECUTION YEAR ISSUE
Issue Timing:   
OUTYEAR ISSUE
 
Figure 6.   E-2C Hawkeye Cost Adjustment Sheet 
 
Figure 7 illustrates a MH-53E maintenance process change submission 
that reflects the need for an additional $1.4 million in near term funding followed by a 
projected $5.8 million in cost savings in the out years.  As illustrated with this CAS, the 
capability to breakout cost effects on individual SICs (FA and FM) enhances the systems 





T/M/S: APML Name/Code/Phone: 
Submitting PMA: IWST Name/Code/Phone: 
Fleet Class Desk Name/Code/Phone: 
Adjustment Category: 
System: WUC(s): 
NIIN(s): Material Support Date: 
Issue Description:
O&M $ (in Thousands) FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011
Flight Hour Basis for Estimates: 10,857              10,087                   8,474                     8,474                     8,474                     8,474                     8,474                     8,474                     
AVDLR (FA) As Is Cost: $6,486.5 $5,449.3 $5,449.3 $5,449.3 $5,449.3 $5,449.3 $5,449.3
AVDLR (FA) To Be Cost: $6,115.8 $6,046.3 $5,424.5 $4,892.3 $4,449.7 $4,126.8 $3,744.7
AVDLR Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 ($370.7) $597.0 ($24.7) ($557.0) ($999.5) ($1,322.4) ($1,704.5)
Consumables (FM) As Is Cost $2,427.5 $2,039.3 $2,039.3 $2,039.3 $2,039.3 $2,039.3 $2,039.3
Consumables (FM) To Be Cost $3,125.3 $2,442.4 $2,191.2 $1,976.2 $1,797.4 $1,667.0 $1,512.6
Consumables Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $697.8 $403.0 $151.9 ($63.1) ($241.9) ($372.3) ($526.7)
FHP Contract (FW) As Is Cost:
FHP Contract (FW) To Be Cost:
FHP Contract Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
FHP Support (FO) As Is Cost
FHP Support (FO) To Be Cost
FHP Support Funding Impact (Delta): $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Overall FHP Funding Impact (Delta) $0.0 $327.1 $1,000.1 $127.2 ($620.1) ($1,241.4) ($1,694.7) ($2,231.2)
PR07  Flying Hour Program Cost Adjustment Sheet (CAS)
Engine CIP
Primary Investment Type: 
FY04 should contain actual costs (put them in the "AS IS" & leave the "TO BE" blank).  FY05-11 should contain projected "AS IS" & "TO BE" costs in Constant 
Year 2004 Dollars.  Do NOT Inflate.  Positive delta values equate to additional cost; negative delt






FY05 Delta Breakout:  BSR = $826K, ERF III = $1,600K                                                                                                                                                                                                           
T64 Engine Time-On-Wing (TOW) has severely degraded due to outdated build specifications, compressor erosion, oil leakage, inadequate repair procedures, sand ingestion, test cell data acquisition/analysis 
inadequacies, and support equipment deficiencies. 
"TO BE" Methodology & Analysis (Reliability, Repair Cost Assumptions, ...)
"AS IS" Methodology (Reliability, Repair Cost Assumptions, ...)










Cost Estimating Basis:    
FIXED COST
VARIABLE COST (USAGE BASED)
EXECUTION YEAR ISSUE
Issue Timing:   
OUTYEAR ISSUE
 
Figure 7.   MH-53E Cost Adjustment Sheet 
 
The second enhancement to the AVDLR budgeting process lies with the 
incorporation of the CNA Demand Factor into the FA pricing model.  This factor 
materialized due to the need to address more accurately the issues surrounding the 
Navy’s aging aircraft inventory and corresponding increase in failure rates on major 
system components.  Following an extensive study by the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA) into the causes of rapidly escalating AVDLR costs, OPNAV revamped the 
existing pricing model in FY03 and subsequently incorporated the changes into the 
Department’s formulation of its annual budget submissions. 
The Demand Factor multiplier represents a percentage change in BCMs 
per flight hour, which translates into a change in AVDLR (FA) cost per flight hour for 
incorporation into the OP-20.  The drive behind the multipliers implementation was the 
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result of a threefold increase in AVDLR costs between 1992 and 200139 and OPNAV’s 
inability to account adequately for this increase in subsequent budget submissions.  A 
significant contributor to this increase in AVDLR costs is due to the increasing number of 
BCMs per flight hour experienced in recent years, which is a direct manifestation of the 
Navy’s aging aircraft fleet. 
 
 
Figure 8.  
                                                
 CNAF BCM/FH vs. Aircraft Age40 
 
Provided below are the estimating equations for calculating the AVDLR 
Demand Factor.  The unique flight profiles and airframe stresses experienced by the 
respective categories of aircraft requires the use of three separate equations. 
Carrier/extra complex (CEC) 
BCM per Flight Hour = ACECage.6612h-.2236  
 
39 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA Sept) Study, "Results on the Cost of the Naval Flight Hour Program," 
September 2003, p. 4. 
40 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Carrier/extra complex (CEC):  This aircraft grouping includes carrier 
aircraft, antisubmarine warfare fixed-wing and rotary, and helicopters with substantial 
avionics components that are subject to carrier based operations. 
Land-based fixed wing (LBFW) 
BCM per Flight Hour = ALBFWage.3265h-.2236
Land-based fixed wing (LBFW):  Included in this group are the individual 
C-130, P-3 and E-6 TMS aircraft. 
Helicopters (HELO) 
BCM per Flight Hour = AHELOage.4363h-.2236
*Carrier/extra complex estimating equation in the forecasting of changes 
to BCMs per flight hour for the F/A-18C. 
The following scenario illustrates the utilization and resulting output of the 
Carrier/extra complex equation.  The data used is purely for illustrative purposes and 
does not represent actual or forecasted data. 
TMS:  F/A-18Cs 
FY03 average age:  14.2 years 
FY04 average age:  15.2 years 
FY03 flight hours:  1,650 
FY04 flight hours (projected):  1,568 (5% drop from prior year) 
BCM per Flight Hour in FY04/BCM per Flight Hour in FY03 
 = (15.2/14.2).6612(.95)-.2236  =  1.05809 
The equation allows for a projection of follow-on year BCM rates based on ratios of 
current year to projected follow on year average inventory ages (age) and year-to-year 
changes in funded flight hour (h) levels.  The "age elasticity of BCM/FH" (.6612 for CEC 
aircraft) gives the percentage change in BCMs/FH for a one percent change in the 
average age of the particular TMS.  The "relative flight hour elasticity" (-.2236 for CEC 
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aircraft)  is constant for all three aircraft categories and means that for every one percent 
increase in flight hours, the number of BCMs/FH will decrease by .2236 percent. 
  This example forecasts a 5.809% increase in BCMs per flight hour 
resulting from an increase in the average age of the F/A-18C inventory of one year and a 
five percent decrease in budgeted flight hours from FY03 to FY04.  The AVDLR pricing 
model then incorporates this percentage change into the categories cost per hour 
calculation.  The appendix to the corresponding CNA study provides a detailed 
mathematical decomposition of the BCM per flight hour equations.41
c. Effectiveness of Changes 
The incorporation of CAVTS and the CNA Demand factor into the FA 
pricing model has garnered substantial support from FHP budget analysts at OPNAV, as 
well as, program managers at CNAP.  First, accurately identifying the fleets aging aircraft 
inventory as a significant cost driver should allow for a more accurate assessment and 
projection of present and future funding needs.  Second, CAVTS provides improved 
visibility and understanding of cause and effect relationships within the FHP by 
providing a forum to express projected programmatic changes at the TMS level.  
NAVAIR envisions even further benefits from the system as the database continues to 
mature over the POM-06 process. 
The following table provides a comparison of budgeted dollars to actual 
execution over the years FY02 through FY05 year to date. As seen by the FY04 figures, 
the budgeted calculation of $2,359 per hour matched very closely with the $2,354 per 
hour execution rate.  Though the CNA Demand factor and CAVTS were available for 
FY03 OP-20 cost projections, the FY04 FHP budget was the first to recognize any 
significant benefits.  A true measure of effectiveness, however, will require the execution 
of additional budget cycles to allow for a more accurate quantitative analysis of 
OPNAV’s ability to match OP-20 budgeted dollars with actual fleet execution. 
 
41 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study, "The Effect of Aging Equipment on Depot-Level Repair of Aircraft 
Components," March 2002, pp. 21-23. 
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CNAF FA/DLR Cost per Hour Summary 
  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 ytd
Presidential Budget (PB) Cost per Hour $1,854  $2,085  $2,359   $2,397  
Actual Cost per Hour $1,901   $2,210   $2,354   $2,110  
 
Table 2.   CNAF FA/DLR Cost per Hour Summary42 
 
d. Remaining Concerns 
An area of the FA budgeting process still in need of improvement lies with 
more accurately identifying expected AVDLR requirements of retiring aircraft.  As 
evidenced during the final years leading to the retirement of the A-6 Intruder in the mid-
1990's, and now with the accelerated retirement of the F-14 Tomcat and S-3 Viking, FHP 
facilitators must justify a substantial under-execution of appropriated funds.  This over-
estimation of AVDLR funding requirements resulted in the improper allocation of scarce 
program dollars and provides an opportunity for a heightened level of skepticism on the 
part of budget analysts on the true needs of specific FHP SICs. 
In conjunction with a study on the rising support costs associated with the 
aging of the navy's aircraft inventory, researchers at the Center for Naval Analysis 
discovered that as a TMS nears retirement, there is often a period of extremely high 
readiness.  This increase in readiness  is attributable to three findings: 1) Aircraft are 
selectively decommissioned; 2) The number of spare parts does not drop in proportion to 
number of retired aircraft, therefore, there are more spare parts per aircraft; 3) The 
number of maintenance personnel and resources available do not normally drop in 
proportion to the number of aircraft retired.43
The recent retirement of the F-14 Tomcat from CNAP squadrons in FY04 
and the projected FY06 retirement of all CNAL F-14s provides continued evidence to the 
inability by OPNAV to accurately account for the reduction in funding requirements of 
                                                 
42 Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N432D) budget analyst E-mail, 9 May 2005. 
43 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study, "Support Costs and Aging Aircraft:  Implications for Budgeting and 
Procurement," January 2002, p. 30. 
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retiring aircraft.  Tables 2 and 3 provide actual execution and expected (Target Should 
Cost) direct cost expenditure data for both CNAP and CNAL F-14 Tomcats from FY02 
through year to date FY05. 
CNAP F-14 FHP AVDLR SUMMARY 
FY Execution 







       
2002 $24,103,608  $18,805,548  ($5,298,060) (28.2)% 
       
2003 $25,606,741  $30,785,958  $5,179,217  16.8% 
       
2004 $1,999,603  $3,564,682  $1,565,079  43.9% 
       
2005 YTD 
thru 31 Mar NA NA NA NA 
 
Table 3.   CNAP F-14 AVDLR Execution Summary44 
 
As depicted in Table 3, CNAP F-14s saw a more traditional over 
execution of AVDLR costs in FY02 of 28.2 percent.  Within two years of the complete 
decommissioning of CNAP assets, however, AVDLR spending experienced an under 
execution of 16.8 percent and 43.9 percent in FY03 and FY04 respectively.  These 
figures compared to a CNAP wide variation of 0 percent and 13.6 percent over execution 
in the same years.45
In line with CNAP F-14 data, CNAL F-14s appear to be following a 
similar pattern of under execution within two years of expected full scale 
decommissioning.  FY03 saw a 21.1 percent over execution in line with the fleet wide 
over execution for the year.  Both F-14s and the fleet as a whole experienced an under 
execution of 10.6 percent in FY04.  FY05 year to date data reflects a 52.0 percent level of 
under execution for the F-14 compared to a 23.4 percent level for all CNAL assets.  As 
with the CNAP data, CNAL summary data includes F-14 AVDLR under execution data.  
                                                 
44 All figures obtained from CNAF sponsored AFAST website.  Dollar amounts reflect direct FHP costs only  and 
is exclusive of Reserve squadron data. (AFAST captures approximately 90% of total FHP costs)   
45 The FY03 zero percent deviation from expected execution by CNAP as a whole is inclusive of F-14 under 
execution data.  Recalculation of FY03 CNAP summary net of F-14’s data would result in a fleet wide over execution 
for the fiscal year. 
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Therefore, the 23.4 percent CNAL wide under execution figure exaggerates actual 
execution due to incorporation of the TYCOMs F-14 under execution data into the 
summary calculation. 
 
CNAL F-14 FHP AVDLR SUMMARY 
FY Execution 







       
2002 $192,781,749  $153,521,685  ($39,260,064) (25.6)% 
       
2003 $197,967,965  $163,428,546  ($34,539,419) (21.1)% 
       
2004 $157,570,336  $176,189,098  $18,618,762  10.6% 
       
YTD 2005 
thru 31 Mar $28,080,161  $58,527,141  $30,446,979  52.0% 
 
Table 4.   CNAL F-14 AVDLR Execution Summary46 
 
2. (FM/maint) Consumables (AFM) 
a. Current Process 
The FM/maint pricing model utilizes three input variables in calculating 
the SIC's cost per hour (by TMS).  The three variables include the Certified Actual 
Expenditure Cost per Hour, any Forecasted Programmatic Adjustments as submitted 
through CAVTS, and the WCF baseline Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment.  The 
following equation provides a derivation of the projected FM cost per hour. 
                                                 
46 All figures obtained from CNAF sponsored AFAST website.  Dollar amounts reflect direct FHP costs only and 
is exclusive of Reserve squadron data.  (AFAST captures approximately 90% of total FHP costs.)    
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Certified Actual Expenditures (Most recent FY cost per hour) 
X 
Demand Factor (CNA) 
+/- 
Forecast Programmatic Adjustments/Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System 
(CAVTS) 
X 
Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment  
÷ 
Projected flight hours 
= 
Projected FM cost per hour (by TMS) 
The Consumable (FM) pricing methodology is identical to the FA pricing 
model less the CNA Demand Factor. 
b. What Has Changed and Why 
There have been two primary changes in determining the funding 
requirement for consumables.  As with the AVDLR pricing model, the calculation of the 
FM cost per hour incorporates CAVTS inputs to determine the level of OP-20 funding.  
The second change involves the removal of non-recurring costs from the actual 
expenditure baseline.  OPNAV incorporated these changes in an effort to reduce the 
growing level of over execution within the FM funding element and to align more 
accurately funding requirements in support of the new FRTP. 
CAVTS serves the same purpose for FM cost per hour formulation as with 
the AVDLR (FA) funding element.  The system allows for an expanded awareness of 
potential issues that may result in significant changes to proposed OP-20 cost per hour 
calculations.  Additionally, through the Cost Adjustment Sheet submission and review 
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process, the OPNAV resource sponsor can not only assess out year budget requirements 
more effectively, but identify the emergence of any unforeseen current year unfunded 
requirements as well. 
The second enhancement to the FM budgeting process entails the removal 
of non-recurring costs prior to the formulation of OP-20 requirements.  This change to 
the pricing model is in an attempt to better align OP-20 funding levels with the Navy's 
implementation of the FRTP.  This new Navy wide training plan receives funding to 
support basic T&R requirements only, and does not account for non-recurring cost of war 
(COW) augments or mission essential support hours required by specific TMS.  As a 
result, all FM costs receive a bottom up review to determine the level of non-recurring 
costs directly associated with fleet operations (OEF/OIF, etc).  Once identified, OPNAV 
removes these costs from the certified expenditure baseline prior to application of the 
WCF escalation factor/rate adjustment. 
c. Effectiveness of Changes 
As with the enhancements to the FA budgeting process, FHP managers 
acknowledge a perceived improvement in the ability of the program to match budgeted 
dollars with actual fleet execution.  The aforementioned benefits of CAVTS, with its 
initial focus on AVDLR issues, since expanded its reach to allow further refinement of 
the FM pricing model.  The following table provides a comparison of budgeted dollars to 
actual execution over the years FY02 through FY05 year to date.  As with FA SIC, 
additional budget cycles will be necessary to draw definitive conclusions. 
 
CNAF FM/Consumables Cost per Hour Summary 
  FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 ytd
Presidential Budget (PB) Cost per Hour $783  $825  $804  $989  
Actual Cost per Hour $918   $1,078   $1,070   $979  
 
Table 5.   CNAF FM/Consumables Cost per Hour Summary47 
 
 
                                                 
47 Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N432D) budget analyst E-mail, 9 May 2005. 
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d. Remaining Concerns 
The continuous escalation in aviation consumable funding requirements 
has failed to garner the interest afforded the rapid growth in AVDLR costs during recent 
years.  However, in conjunction with the fleets accelerating rate of depot level repairs and 
the fact that consumable material makes up a significant percent of the cost of these 
repairs, FM funding requirements warrant comparable attention.  This direct link with 
increased AVDLR costs has been on top of steadily increasing acquisition costs.  Based 
on a NAVAIR Cost Department/Aging Aircraft IPT study48, consumable acquisition 
costs are growing at eight to ten percent per year.  Accounting for this growth, 1.3 
percent has been due to normal inflation, one percent resulting from the introduction of 
new items into the inventory system, and two to three percent due to the historical ramp 
up of demand of newly introduced items.  The net growth trend across all consumables, 
therefore, has seen an increase in acquisition cost of three percent per year above 
inflation.49
 
48 Stoll, Laurence W., Naval Air Systems Command briefing for Aging Aircraft Forum, "Analysis of Operations 
and Support Cost Trends or Why do Aging Aircraft Cost so Much," 6-8 October 2004,  
http://www.washingtonscea.com/Presentations/SCEA_Nov_23_2004_Navy_Flying_Hr_Program.pdf, slide 40. 
49 Ibid., slide 40. 
 
Figure 9.  
                                                
 CNAF FY93 to FY02 Consumable Cost Growth50  
 
Recognizing this significant increase in annual acquisition costs, in 
conjunction with existing empirical data supporting one of the contributing causal factors, 
continued efforts should focus on developing an additional "demand factor" variable in 
the FM pricing model.  The importance of a demand factor comparable to that used in the 
FA pricing model emerged from an affiliated study on rising AVDLR costs.  The Center 
for Naval Analysis found a positive correlation between consumable rate usage and 
number of BCMs per year.  In line with the previously discussed rise in BCM rates, this 
finding suggests that there should be a corresponding increase in consumable costs.  
Currently, no “multiplier” accounts for this cost driver and its associated effect on 
funding level requirements.  Though important in helping formulate any future budget 
requirements, this factor represents merely one element of an invariably complex cost 
 
50 Ibid., slide 35. 
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estimating equation, therefore, further detailed analysis is necessary to uncover the 
additional cost drivers affecting consumable rate usage. 
 
Figure 10.   
                                                
CNAF Consumable Issues vs. BCMs51 
 
3. FW/Contract 
a. Current Process 
The FW/Contract utilizes two input variables in calculating the SICs 
projected contract cost per hour.  The two variables are comprised of NAVAIR-
sponsored and Fleet-sponsored maintenance contracts.  The following equation calculates 
the projected FW cost per hour. 
 
 
51 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study, "Results on the Cost of the Naval Flight Hour Program", September 
2003, p. 40. 
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NAVAIR-sponsored maintenance contracts 
+ 
Fleet-sponsored maintenance contracts 
÷  
Projected flight hours 
= 
Projected FW cost per hour (by TMS)  
As with the establishment of the FM baseline, OPNAV removed all non-
recurring FW costs from the OP-20 budgeting process.  The failure to accurately identify 
and remove these non-recurring costs significantly hindered OPNAV's ability to project 
realistic future program funding requirements for peacetime operations.  This "scrubbed" 
baseline figure then takes into account any new NAVAIR or Fleet awarded contracts and  
incorporates them into the overall budget requirement. 
b. What Has Changed and Why 
The creation of the FW SIC was a result of OPNAVs continued efforts in 
specifically identifying what actions are driving the particular funding requirements 
within the FHP.  In the construction of previous OP-20s, the FM (consumables) SIC 
absorbed all contract (FW) costs.  As a result, the FW SIC routinely received an 
inadvertent WCF escalation factor/rate adjustment.  This inadvertent and unwanted 
application of the escalation factor led to the creation of a separate FW SIC and current 
cost estimation equation. 
c. Effectiveness of Changes 
The need exists for more historical data to draw any definitive conclusions 
on how accurately OPNAV now budgets for the contract requirements of the FHP; 
however, the development of the "FW" SIC clearly improves the ability to match 
performed activities with associated costs.  With CNAP FW outlays totaling $81.5 in 
FY04, the former practice of incorporating all contract expenditures within the FM SIC 
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would have resulted in a 16 percent overstatement of actual FM requirements.52  By 
disaggregating contract and consumable costs, TYCOMs now have the ability to assess 
more accurately their year-to-date execution of OP-20 funding.  Additionally, OPNAV 
can more easily capture the benefits of category specific cost savings and recapitalize 
them within Naval aviation. 
d. Remaining Concerns 
The operational requirements and associated funding levels needed to 
prosecute the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have had a significant impact on Marine 
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) aviation squadrons.  The drastically increased operating 
tempo above normal peacetime operations sheds light on an existing problem with the 
new budgeting process.  Because the current program only supports funding levels 
needed to satisfy peacetime training requirements, over-execution and the need for 
supplemental cost of war funding is essential.  With Marine squadrons currently carrying 
a significant portion of the Department's GWOT aviation requirements, CNAP must 
quickly identify scarce funds from under-executing SICs to satisfy Marine squadron 
spending rates.  CNAP then faces the familiar dilemma of redirecting funds from one 
requirement to the next early in the fiscal year in anticipation of receiving relief in later 
quarters from subsequent defense supplemental appropriations.  Despite becoming 
commonplace in recent FY budget cycles, the uncertainty of emergency supplementals in 
the future may mandate a shift in this practice. 
The expeditionary nature of Marine aviation lends itself more to contract 
maintenance then its navy air counterparts.  The requirement for quick response in 
forward deployed locations frequently leads to the unavailability of military personnel or 
equipment in sufficient quantities to fulfill all of the squadron's maintenance needs.  The 
aggressive use of Contract Field Teams therefore has had a pronounced impact on FW 
cost per hour figures.  From FY03 through second quarter FY05, MARFORPAC 
squadrons witnessed a corresponding 25 percent, 39 percent and 22 percent FW cost per 
 
52 Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific FY04 Certified Flight Hour Cost Report, September 2004. 
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hour over-execution rate.53  This necessary and unavoidable increase to cost per hour 
figures is forcing CNAP program managers to adjust current quarter spending rates in 
other areas of the FHP to accommodate a wartime scenario with a peacetime budget.  The 
recent passage of the $82 billion defense supplemental will undoubtedly help satisfy this 
increase, but the shuffling of budgeted funds in the interim poses difficult challenges for 
all parties involved. 
 
G. FO (FO/SUPPORT) 
1. Current Process  
The Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N43) puts out a request 
in early October for FO requirements from all Budget Submitting Offices.  The Budget 
Submitting Office ensures a sufficient review of all submitted FO requirements by the 
appropriate program managers, as well as, a mandate for input submissions with 
associated justification to CNO N432D no later than December 1st. 
CNAP requests FO requirements, broken into separate accounts, from its 
subordinate units.  Upon receipt, analysts review requirements against historic costs and 
make an inflation adjustment, usually about 3%.  Next, the analysts summarize similar 
costs from each unit into different account line items discussed earlier and submits this 
information to N432D with justification. 
2. Changes Underway 
The FO budgeting process has not changed during the period reviewed by these 
researchers, but—it is in the process of changing.  CNAP presently has integrated process 
teams (IPTs) for each category of FO, which are attempting to develop models that will 
enable a better prediction of FO funding requirements.  The IPTs have a difficult job.  
After all, as Other in the name accurately describes, this category comprises all the 
support and miscellaneous costs that do not fit into any other category. 
 
53 Naval Air Systems Command CAVTS Report, POM06 E-2C C-2A 60KVA Generator.xls, 
https://qtrdeck.nalda.navy.mil/cavts/fhilib01.nsf, 07 April 2005. 
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One of the most difficult costs in the FO budget to model is Transportation of 
Things (TOT), which includes everything from transporting a damaged aircraft to an 
IMA or aviation depot facility to shipping aircraft parts via FedEx to units deployed in 
Iraq.  These costs are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to project and difficult to 
control.  The difficulty arises from the fact that the costs are reactionary to events that 
transpire, as in the case of unplanned damage to an aircraft.  Additionally, a unit deployed 
to Iraq who frequently ships parts via FedEx in an effort to reduce shipping time, when 
cheaper but potentially slower government transportation is available, will have an 
adverse effect on the original budget forecast.  Complicating the issue further, the 
significant time delay between the obligation of funds by the squadron and the eventual 
recognition of the transaction in CNAP's flight hour account, exacerbates the difficulty in 
accurately forecasting FO requirements. 
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IV. CNAP EXECUTION 
A. (OFC-1) AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS (AFO) 
1. (FF/fuel) 7B 
a. Current Process 
As in the past, the few echelons above CNAP still withhold a small 
portion of the FHP funds.  CNAP determines the amount of a TACAIR unit’s quarterly 
Operational Target Functional Categories Funds (OFCs) commonly known as Operating 
Targets (OPTARS) using four factors:  1) the unit’s period in the 27-month Fleet 
Readiness Training Plan (FRTP); 2) its deployed status; 3) its authorized crews on board 
(ACOB); and 4) its cost per hour (CPH) for TMS aircraft flown.  CNAP separately funds 
any approved cost of war (COW) augment requested by Fleet or Theater Commanders. 
  CNAP’s FHP Manager calculates the quarterly OPTAR for each squadron 
or detachment using the following method.  For each month of the quarter, the manager 
calculates the baseline T&R funding by multiplying the 100 percent T&R hours for TMS 
by the readiness percentage for the specific month of the IDRC.  Next, the manager adds 
the appropriate MESH factor based on TMS, deployment status, and period in the IDRC.  
Finally, the manager multiplies this sum by the ACOB for the unit and the CPH for the 
TMS to determine the OPTAR for that month.  The equation below illustrates the 
calculation for one month. 
Monthly OPTAR = (fraction of 100% T&R + MESH factor) x ACOB x CPH 
Since the federal government distributes funds quarterly, CNAP funds OPTAR quarterly.  
Hence, CNAP distributes the sum of appropriate quarterly OPTAR to each carrier air 
wing (CVW) and Type Wing for further distribution according to their subordinate 
commands.  CNAP charges the CVWs and Type Wings with managing and balancing 
distribution among their subordinate units. 
b. What Has Changed and Why 
The readiness-based distribution of OPTAR using the method described 
above is new.  Until FY2003, CNAP used historical data to determine the distribution of 
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FHP funds.  While CNAP has always expected units to meet readiness goals throughout a 
deployment cycle, CNAP based its budgeting decisions on historic funding for similar 
periods in the deployment cycle.  CNAP still funds to achieve a desired readiness profile 
across the deployment cycle, but now determines those funds based on the T&R model 
verses historical execution. 
Another change is the focus on what is measured in terms of funding.  The 
CNAF/CNAP FHP Manager states “. . . hour execution is the metric—not dollars.” 
Although OPTAR is defined in dollars, funding is considered to be in terms of hours—
not dollars or percentage of PMR.  “CNAF relies on execution of HOURS to attain the 
readiness levels required by FRTP.”  The manager monitors the hours flown and 
readiness reported by each unit.  “If additional funding is required to meet the flying 
hours granted for the quarter, coordination with CNAL/CNAP FHP managers will 
provide the means for a dollar augment to ensure hours execution.  Conversely, if at the 
end of a quarter a squadron has 7B money remaining—this money will be recouped by 
the FHP manager and is not to be executed in hours over the funding profile.”   
c. Effectiveness of Changes 
CNAP’s execution methodology of the T&R based FHP substantially 
reduces funding across the Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP).  Just as the budgeting based on 
T&R matrices reduced the hour requirement by 13 percent, the execution method based 
on T&R matrices also causes a reduction in hours allotted due to the reductions made in 
the T&R matrices previously discussed. 
d. Remaining Concerns 
The inherent problems of taxes or “withholds”, timeliness, spending rates 
and management information systems, color of money, and limited flexibility in budget 
execution discussed by Philips in his June 2001 thesis still remain and probably always 
will.54  Accurately described as inherent, it is the design of the federal funding process 
and size of the organization that cause these problems.  Although the Navy cannot change 
 
54 Phillips, pp. 7-9. 
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these inherent problems, the Navy can still make significant improvements to the 
execution process. 
CNAF recognizes and states this need for improvement: 
We produce readiness and warfighting capability, and our successful 
pursuits have been without a careful eye to the costs.  We must now 
generate readiness with a sharper eye toward cost to ensure that we are 
firmly in control of our future. 
The CNO said it best in his 2003 Sea Power policy statement:  ‘A key 
ingredient to sustaining both our readiness today and our investment for 
the future is ensuring we produce current readiness from every dollar.  
This requires involved and energetic leadership, innovative thinking, 
calculated risk taking and willingness to change [in order] to strengthen 
our combat effectiveness.’ 
We are applying those principles in Naval Aviation as we move from 
“readiness at any cost” to “cost-wise readiness.”  Our goals are to build 
and continue to maintain the premier power projection force for peace, to 
continue the War on Terror, and to institutionalize the surge capability of 
the FRP. 
We have set a steady course to find efficiencies in achieving that 
readiness.  To do that, we must know and understand how our business 
works and how our business processes function.  It requires rigorous and 
unbiased introspection and self-assessment.  It requires soliciting and 
listening to outside perspectives and evaluations. 
We need to measure our processes against today’s best business practices 
in other disciplines, across other professions, including government and 
industry.  We must know our business, the business of Naval Aviation and 
the business of producing readiness, in order to make it as efficient as 
possible.55
In his article in Hook Magazine, VADM Malone goes on to discuss the 
concept and process of AIRSpeed and the improvements it will make to reducing the 
costs of maintaining aircraft and achieving cost-wise readiness.  However, AIRSpeed 
 
55  VADM Mallon, http://www.tailhook.org/Brf_Su04.htm, 22 May 2005. 
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only addresses the second part of the cost equation—what drives the CPH.  It does not 
address the first part of the cost equation—hours flown. 
The changes to the T&R matrices address the hours portion of the 
equation, but from a budget planning perspective.  As McCaffery and Mutty point out, “. 
. . budget execution is a management process.”56  Unfortunately, as Philips states, “. . . 
little attention is paid to budget execution.”57  Efficient budget execution is a vital part, 
perhaps the most important part, of “. . . ensuring we produce current readiness from 
every dollar.”58  Budget execution is, after all, the entire reason that OPNAV prepares 
and justifies the FHP.59  
As ADM Mallon suggested, let us look at two simple examples of today’s 
best business practices with Starbucks and Southwest Airlines, focusing on efforts to 
achieve optimal efficiency in routine tasks of their operation.  The Starbucks example 
involves redesigning ice scoops and the Southwest Airlines example involves aircraft 
turnarounds at gates. 
The following is a quote about Starbucks from the Wall Street Journal: 
“This is a game of seconds," says Silvia Peterson, Starbucks's director of 
store operations engineering, adding that she and her team of 10 engineers 
are constantly asking themselves: "How can we shave time off this?" 
A few years ago, engineers noticed that "baristas" -- the Starbucks 
employees who prepare drinks -- had to dig into ice bins twice to scoop up 
enough ice for a Venti-size cold beverage, Starbucks's biggest.  "The old 
Venti scoop didn't give you enough ice," Ms. Peterson says.  Engineers 
experimented with ceramic coffee mugs, which then led them to develop 
one-piece plastic "volumetric ice scoops."  But the handles kept breaking, 
so engineers had stronger ones made.  The new scoops helped cut 14 
seconds off the average preparation time for blended beverages of about 
one minute. 
 
56 McCaffery, p. 233. 
57 Phillips, p. 5. 
58 VADM Mallon. 
59 McCaffery, p. 233. 
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Efforts like these have helped Starbucks outlets increase their average 
yearly volume by nearly $200,000, to roughly $940,000, since 1999, 
executives say.60
Notice the efficiency striving mentality and effort displayed by Starbucks.  
Starbucks saw the value of investing the time of a director and team of ten engineers in 
redesigning an ice scoop to shave 14 seconds off a step of a routine task.  Does a similar 
mentality and effort exist throughout the Navy?  Does today’s Naval leadership look at 
the daily processes performed in our work centers and departments and ask ourselves, “Is 
there a better way to perform this task?”  Can we apply this mentality and level of effort 
to the routine tasks of servicing aircraft, replacing engines, conducted inspections, and 
administrating our squadrons? 
The following two examples suggest that, in fact, the Navy does not 
always seek out efficient practices.  At least one of these researchers will argue that we 
do not with two simple examples.  Personal experience has shown that very few YNs and 
PNs possess the most basic level of user knowledge of Microsoft Word.  The evidence 
for this is manual insertion of page numbers and headers into instructions instead of using 
the designed software feature for these tasks.  This is an example of where the Navy has 
spent the funds to acquire the tools to improve the efficiency of routine operations, but 
fails to train properly our tool operators. 
The second personal example illustrates the efficiencies possible by 
applying this business mentality.  A squadron aviation-training department was manually 
drafting forms listing each individual using a word processor to document training in 
each work center.  This process took the full department a solid week to prepare and print 
forms for the monthly training.  By engineering a new method of documenting and 
tracking the training and by instructing the department on using the new method, the 
department head reduced the process time by 90 percent to a half day of work.  This freed 
a proportional amount of personnel that were now available for assignment to the hangar 
deck to perform aircraft maintenance.  
 
60 Gray, Steven, “Coffee on the Double,” Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2005, p. B1. 
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The second example of best business practices involves Southwest 
Airlines who shortened the turnaround time at the gate for its aircraft to fifteen minutes 
using only six employees verse the industry average of one hour using twelve 
employees—a 75 percent reduction in process time using half the manpower!61  What 
enabled Southwest Airlines to improve drastically a routine task that their competitors 
with greater experience failed to achieve?  Contrast this to the following personal 
example of one of the researchers. 
A common practice of at least one helicopter squadron at NAS North 
Island is to go through the hot pits62 at the end of every flight, even if the aircraft is not 
scheduled to fly until the next day.  What is the cost to the FHP to fuel unnecessarily an 
aircraft in the hot pits when cold refueling would not interfere with scheduled operations?  
Let us assume the total cost per hour is $2,800, if the extra time it takes to go through the 
hot pits is 15 minutes, the approximate cost each time this occurs is $700.63  This does 
not include the additional cost of the hot pit crew, which is more expensive than the cost 
of cold refueling with a fuel truck in the line. 
Until we consider compounding, the amount of $700 dollars seems 
insignificant.  Let us also assume the squadron unnecessarily hot refuels two of its eight 
aircraft only once each day for 250 days of the year.  The annual direct cost incurred by 
the squadron against the FHP is $350,000 or 125 flight hours. 
If we assume every squadron in the Navy is identical in composition, 
costs, and practice, the annual total cost would be approximately $105 million.64  
 
61 Southwest Airlines, University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA, UVA-OM-0743, 
1993, p. 9. 
62 “Hot pits” are refueling facilities at specific, usually isolated, locations on an airfield where an aircraft can be 
refueled without shutting down the engines of the aircraft. 
63 Some might argue the cost to operate on the ground is not equal to the average annual CPH.  The researcher 
argues it is reasonable in this case because the aircraft is a helicopter undergoing vibration and wear of all its moving 
components.  Furthermore, it was standard practice in this squadron to log this time as flight time.  Therefore, this 
ground time is part of the time used to calculate the annual average CPH. 
64 This calculation assumes 25 percent of the 2,404 FY05 PAA are each unnecessarily hot refueled once per day 
for 250 days in a year. 
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Compare this amount to the FY05 $62 million average cost of a combat aircraft and the 
amount is significant. 
The interesting thing about this example is the Navy recognizes at least 
some of the inefficiencies of this practice and has instructions prohibiting unnecessary 
hot refueling at the air station where this occurred.  Unfortunately, the squadron does not 
adhere to the instruction because they do not understand the cost.  The air station has 
difficulty enforcing the regulation because the squadron does not fall under the chain of 
command of the air station Commanding Officer, who prohibited the unnecessary hot 
refueling primarily to reduce the hot refueling contract costs of the air station. 
Since what the FHP is buying is readiness, let us look at another example 
focusing on the efficiency of the operations department in scheduling training flights.  
After all, a squadron exists and receives funding to provide a “product.”  That product is 
a certain level of readiness for assigned mission areas, which is attained though 
maintenance of aircraft and the training of its crews.  Therefore, the squadron that 
provides the best value to the taxpayers is the one that achieves the highest level of 
readiness at the lowest cost. 
Let us look at a scheduling decision for a typical operations officer.  
Suppose three pilots are below 70 percent goal of T&R points for PRMAR 1, one pilot 
will fall below 70 percent in 40 days, and three pilots will fall below 70 percent in 83 
days.  Flying training sortie D will provide enough T&R points to raise any of the pilots 
above the 70 percent goal for the following 90 days.  Training sortie D is a two-hour 
sortie, does not require either pilot to be current, and both pilots on the sortie can log the 
training for themselves.  How does the Operation Officer schedule the sorties to 
accomplish this training?  Assuming all have equal qualifications, the optimum way 
would be to schedule two of the below 70 percent pilots together on one sortie and 
schedule the other below 70 percent pilot with the pilot who will fall below 70 percent in 
45 days.  How much improvement in readiness is purchased and at what cost for flying 
each of the pilots below 70 percent with the pilots who will fall below 70 percent in 83 
days?  The improvement in readiness purchased is 271 days at a cost of six hours 
equating to about 45 days of readiness per hour.  The optimum way “purchases” 330 days 
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of improved readiness for the cost of four flight hours equating to 80 days of readiness 
per flight hour—a 78 percent better return!     
Is Naval aviation inevitably inefficient?  Absolutely not.  Any witness of 
carrier flight operations will agree that the Navy’s ability to quickly launch and recover 
aircraft within the confined space of an aircraft carrier is arguably the most time efficient 
examples of aviation operations in the world.  However, the motivation for improving 
efficiency is a key difference between the private industry examples discussed and Naval 
aviation.  Improving profits motivates Starbucks and Southwest Airlines.  Improving the 
ability to project power motivates Naval aviation.   
One of the challenges Naval leadership faces is changing the cultural 
mentality of spending the full amount budgeted, even when a unit can execute operations 
below budget without sacrificing the mission.  Very little incentive, if any, exists to 
operate efficiently.  Actually, one could argue that the government punishes efficient 
operators by giving them fewer funds in following years. 
Even though the federal budget is unfathomably large to most people, it is 
still finite.  Increasing funding for one item decreases the funds available for another.  
Mandatory spending items such as social security and Medicare are already shrinking the 
amount of discretionary funds available for critical items such as aircraft procurement.  
Protecting inefficiencies of the FHP that drive CPH up or reduce the readiness purchased 
per flight hour increases the difficulty of securing funds for critical programs.  It also 
decreases the value per dollar of the FHP making it less competitive when compared to 
other programs facing budget cuts. 
CNAP’s emphasis of hours being the metrics and not dollars appear to be 
an attempt to change this cultural fear of not spending the full amount budgeted.  CNAF’s 
FHP Manager states, “Our goal is to have every squadron execute 100 percent of the 
granted hours in order to meet readiness requirements and defend future budgets.”65  The 
T&R matrix-based FHP model is a way to validate the hours needed for the program that 
 
65 Commander Naval Forces Pacific Flying Hour Program staff member, “FHP Brief + FHP 101” E-mail, 07 
February 2005. 
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is not solely dependant on historical spending.  The T&R matrices create a defense for 
the FHP by demonstrating a direct relationship between hours and readiness. 
 
B. (OFC-50) AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE (AOM) 
Equally important to its role as the primary budgeting document for the FHP, the 
OP-20 serves as the primary roadmap for subsequent program execution.  Following the 
annual build of each funding element (SIC), the formulated cost per hour and bottom line 
figures act as guidance on expected program implementation for the ensuing FY.  
Recognizing the need to improve the link between the documents forecasted dollar 
figures with ultimate execution not only led to the need for budgetary process change, but 
to how CNAF orchestrated the execution of the program as well.  Though some 
adjustments materialized within the AOM account, the realities of fiscally constrained 
resources and the firmly entrenched use of creative cash management techniques fosters 
an environment not entirely receptive to change. 
Unlike the numerous opportunities available to effect the execution of AFO 
dollars, the mere nature and purpose of maintenance funds does not allow for significant 
latitude in terms of execution.  Spending levels result solely from the inherent need for 
aircraft maintenance actions and the CNO promulgated availability rate of fleet aircraft.  
(The Navy currently targets a 73 percent aircraft Mission Capable rate and 56 percent 
Full Mission Capable rate.)66  This mandated availability rate, in conjunction with a 
quantifiable dollar cost for a particular broken aircraft component, suggests little room 
for creative financing.  However, the historic practice of "bow-waving" and unfilled 
customer orders used by CNAP to stretch flying dollars to the end of each fiscal year 
proved to have a significant impact both on current and follow on budget year execution. 
 
66 FY2006/2007 Department of the Navy Budget/Submission to the Secretary of Defense, September 2004, 
https://dbweb.secnav.navy.mil/budbrief/Highlights_Book.html, p. 2-12. 
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1. (FA/DLR) Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) 
a. What Has Changed and Why 
The discontinued practice of "bow-waving" represents the first significant 
change to the execution of the FA SIC.  In simple terms, bow-waving refers to deferring 
the cost of something from the current fiscal year to the next fiscal year.  CNAP 
historically used this technique with AVDLRs to circumvent end of year funding 
shortfalls.  The practice entailed retaining end of year BCM items at an AIMD activity 
until after the new fiscal year to avoid a current year AVDLR (FA) charge.  Though this 
freed up program dollars in the current year, squadrons faced a substantial first quarter 
over execution of FA funds due to the addition of this unbudgeted cost.  Subsequently, 
program managers began each fiscal year attempting to reestablish compliance with a 
level of OP-20 funding that did not accurately reflect actual fleet requirements. 
The second area of change surrounds the former use of unfilled customer 
orders (UCO) as a FHP cash flow strategy.  The practice involved the cancellation or de-
obligation of outstanding requisitions for AVDLRs by individual fleet squadrons to 
recover funds for use in other areas of the FHP.  The original requirement remained 
satisfied however, through an agreement between CNAP and Navy Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP) that all requisitions cancelled required reordering within 45 days after 
the new fiscal year.67  This reallocation of funds unto itself is not seen as faulty execution 
but, as with "bow-waving", program managers chose a near term solution despite the 
known long-term budgetary ramifications to follow on years. 
The habitual use of the aforementioned cash management execution 
practices no longer exists at CNAP for the following reasons.  First, the current DOD 
environment reflects a more business like approach where accurate justification and 
documentation of every budgeted defense dollar is paramount.  Failure to adequately 
defend and support the needs of the program now poses the greatest risk to securing 
future defense funding.  Therefore, the use of creative cash management techniques, and 
 
67 Keating, Peter J. and Paulk, David A. Examination of the Flying Hour Program (FHP) Budgeting Process and 
an Analysis of Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) FHP Underfunding.  Masters Thesis.  Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, December 1998, p. 182 . 
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the inability by OPNAV to account accurately for these unplanned program adjustments 
in the OP-20, mandated the elimination of the practices. 
More importantly, recent enhancements to the tracking of current year 
expenditure rates reduced the chance of program managers getting surprised by end of 
year funding shortfalls, thus eliminating the need for creative financing methods, at least 
as long as funding for the FHP remains robust.  The most significant improvement is due 
to the continuing maturation of the CNAF sponsored Aviation Financial Analysis Tool, 
where monthly snapshots of individual TMS spending rates and execution are available 
throughout the fiscal year.  Originally conceived to enhance the tracking and analysis 
capabilities available to program managers, AFAST since includes individual Type 
Wings in monitoring the FHP costs for their respective type model aircraft.  Further 
refinements to the system afford Type Wing Commanders with an executive summary of 
the FHP cost status for their applicable type model aircraft.  This provides an additional 
echelon of program execution tracking, which further mitigates the chances of unforeseen 
shortfalls at fiscal year end and need for creative cash management practices. 
Figure 11 illustrates one of many outputs of the AFAST web tool.  
AFAST users can display comparable FHP information from the CNAF level down to the 
individual TMS level.  Additionally, Type Wings can download FHP Cockpit Charts, 
which provide a graphic representation of the status of the FHP for their respective 
aircraft type.  Information includes trends in AVDLR and AFM expenditures, fuel and 
overhead costs and year to date average and target cost per hour figures.  A squadron 
version of the Cockpit Charts is presently in work.68
 
68 Commander Naval Air Forces N422 Plans & Policy, "Squadron CO Cost-wise Guide." 2005, p. 10. 
 
 
Figure 11.    AFAST CNAP FHP Summary 
 
b. Remaining Concerns 
The long established culture of using creative cash management practices 
to meet fleet execution requirements remains a credible obstacle to improving the overall 
efficiency of the FA SIC and the FHP as a whole.  Program managers can personally 
justify the manipulation of AVDLR funding as a necessity to ensure adequate numbers of 
aircraft remain available to the operating forces.  The rationale is that the existence of 
adequate transfer authority and availability of defense supplemental appropriations will 
recoup any funding shortfalls produced.  However, Congress will not provide war related 
supplementals forever – probably not beyond FY 2007 – so this source of funding will 
dry up, which will provide new challenges to FHP execution.  In addition, there exists the 
strong belief that the needs of the war fighter today outweigh the potentially negative 
impacts budget manipulation may have to funding levels tomorrow.  Overcoming this 
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culture, therefore, must remain at the forefront of CNAP's agenda in creating a more 
efficient FHP. 
Supporting the CNO's message that "the era of readiness at any price is 
over,"69 the required shift in mindset will require a continued emphasis by senior 
leadership to look at the FHP as a business venture that relies on sound financial decision 
making for its long-term health.  This translates into executing the budget for each year as 
closely to the OP-20 funding level as possible and not circumventing the documents true 
intent with creative end of year financing.  This increased emphasis on strict fiscal 
constraint comes at an inauspicious time primarily due to increased demands imposed by 
GWOT.  Additionally, program executors and managers see the inability of recent FHP 
budgetary enhancements to overcome a 6.7 percent annual under funding of CNAP 
AVDLR requirements during the same period, as continued reason for the use of creative 
cash management practices.70  These very issues mandate continued refinement to the 
recently implemented program budgeting changes along with congressional recognition 
of the impact contingency operations have on baseline funding requirements. 
 
C. FO (FO/SUPPORT) 
1. Current Process 
The process for executing the FO account, which has not changed for the period 
studied, is reactionary.  Every account seems to always begin below the amount currently 
needed.  Labor and “must fund” accounts get pay first resulting in the common challenge 
of how to cut the remaining accounts—one item or spreading it. 
The FO manager tracks obligations every month using Standard Accounting and 
Reporting System, Field Level (STARS-FL).  If the unit is noticeably under or over 
spending, the manager asks for explanations.  If over spending is severe, the manager 
 
69 Pappalardo, Joe, "Keeping Up the Fleet," National Defense, January 2005, 
http://nationaldefense.ndia.org/Issues/2005/Jan/KeepingUpTheFleet.htm. 
70 Commander Naval Air Forces CNAF Extranet, M422C5A Downloads,  
https://extra.cnaf.navy.mil/portalmain.asp. 
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consults the deputy controller for guidance in solving the problem.  If under spending is 
identified, the manager can move funds to a different FO account in need of funds.71
2. Remaining Concerns 
The major concern for the FO account has not changed.  FHP managers are still 
struggling with how to effectively budget for the various odd accounts and how to 
manage more effectively the challenging accounts, such as transportation of things.  
Hopefully, the IPTs will develop effective models that will improve both the budgeting 
and execution processes. 
  
 
71 Telephone interview with Flying Hour Program staff member, Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific, San 
Diego, CA, 01 April 2005. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The goal of this thesis was to provide an analysis into the recently implemented 
changes to the OP-20 budget formulation process and ultimate execution of the FHP at 
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific.  The methodology of the study involved an in-
depth description of the funding composition and budgeting process of the OP-20 through 
a comparison of the FY02 and FY05 budget years.  Additionally, the study highlighted 
the resulting impact on the program following the Navy's transition to the Fleet Response 
Plan and the concurrent OP-20 pricing model changes commencing in FY03.  
 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Have the changes to the budgeting models, execution, and procedural methods 
of CNAF's annual FHP improved the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the program 
at CNAP? 
The execution of more budget cycles will be necessary to determine if changes to 
the budgeting models and execution practices reap any significant improvements to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the program.  However, a significant improvement is 
currently evident in the ability of CNAP program managers to validate, justify, and 
defend program requirements.  In comparing  the FY02 and FY05 AFO and AOM 
accounts, the emergence of improved tracking and forecasting tools allow program 
managers to provide more defendable and accurate inputs used in the  construction of the 
OP-20.  This enhancement then translates into an improvement in overall execution by 
more closely matching OP-20 funding levels with actual fleet execution.  Although 
highlighting a single component of the FHP, Table 2 illustrates a less then one percent 
delta between budgeted and executed FA cost per hour figures in FY04 compared with a 
six percent delta in FY03. 
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Answers to the secondary research questions will provide specific outcomes 
resulting from the pricing model enhancements and subsequent execution and procedural 
changes. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What specific changes did OPNAV make to the FHP budgeting models 
and execution methods? 
Chapter III of the study highlights the specific changes to the OP-20 pricing 
models.  The primary impetus for these changes was to allow for more accurate and 
justifiable budgeting of the individual funding elements (SIC) within the OP-20.  The 
following is a summary of these changes. 
Flight Hours:  OPNAV changed the T&R matrices from task-based to sortie-
based.  The change to sortie-based T&R matrices creates a direct link between flight 
hours and readiness that enables OPNAV to defend its FHP requirements in a way that is 
not solely dependant on historical execution. 
FA/DLR:  The FA element of the FHP realized the largest amount of change in 
the calculation of its projected cost per hour.  The two enhancements to the model were 
the incorporation of the Center for Naval Analysis Demand Factor and inclusion of 
programmatic adjustments via the NAVAIR Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking 
System.  The Demand Factor multiplier represents a percentage change in BCMs per 
flight hour, which the FA pricing model translates into a change in AVDLR (FA) cost per 
flight hour for incorporation into the OP-20.  The Cost Adjustment and Visibility 
Tracking System is a NAVAIR sponsored web site tool that facilitates the timely input 
and visibility of programmatic issues that may impact future FA/DLR, FM, FW or FO 
costs.  
FM/Maint:  There have been two primary changes in determining the funding 
requirement for consumables.  As with the AVDLR pricing model, the calculation of the 
FM cost per hour incorporates CAVTS inputs to determine the level of OP-20 funding.  
The second change involves the removal of non-recurring costs from the actual 
expenditure baseline. 
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FW/Contract:  Prior to the changes to the FHP, the FM (consumables) SIC 
absorbed all contract costs.  The creation of a separate FW SIC, that reflects only contract 
related cost estimations, now allows for the identification and budgeting of purely 
contract related items.  Additionally, the current cost estimating equation accounts only 
for recurring NAVAIR and Fleet-sponsored maintenance contract requirements. 
2.   Have improvements in cost and readiness materialized due to these 
changes? 
As previously mentioned, the most significant outcome of the FHP model changes 
is not reflected in direct cost savings but in the ability of budget analysts and program 
managers to more accurately match  program dollars with execution requirements.  Thus, 
program managers now have the supporting documentation needed to better justify and 
defend future funding requests, which can only serve to enhance the overall readiness of 
fleet assets.  Due to the short duration in which the above model changes have been in 
place, however, definitive budget effects are still uncertain.  As illustrated by Table 2 and 
Table 5 in Chapter III, a comparison of actual and budgeted cost per hour figures fail to 
provide any conclusive evidence to improved cost efficiency.  An accurate assessment of 
any recognized benefits will require the passage of more budget cycles to ascertain what 
if any program efficiencies eventually materialize.  
3.  From the view of stakeholders, have these changes proven beneficial, 
detrimental, ineffective, or a combination of the above? 
From the perspective of the CNAF/CNAP FHP Manager, the change to a sortie-
based T&R matrix incorporated into the budgeting and execution models significantly 
improves the FHP manager’s ability to 1) accurately project funding requirements for 
selected readiness goals, and 2) defend the hours of the program against proposed cuts.  
The improvement is to the extent that the manager believes he can practically identify the 
reduction in readiness down to the specific pilots affected by any proposed cut.72  
                                                 
72 Personal interview with Flying Hour Program staff member, Commander Naval Air Force Pacific, San Diego, 
CA, 04 February 2005. 
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Although the pricing model enhancements did not immediately resolve each of 
the funding issues facing the FHP, program managers see the changes as a significant 
step in ensuring the fiscal health of the program.  Both in terms of increased participation 
in the budgeting process by way of CAVTS, as well as, a perceived improvement of 
budget analysts to recognize and satisfy the operational needs of CNAP squadrons, 
program managers view ongoing efforts favorably.  Most notably, the elimination of the 
long-standing execution strategies of "bow waving" and unfilled customer orders 
suggests an increased level of trust with the current pricing models.  This willingness to 
alter AOM related execution practices is important; however, ultimate validation of 
program changes hinges solely on the ability of aviation maintenance to consistently 
provide mission capable aircraft to the fleet.  
4.  How has implementation of the Navy’s FRP affected the budgeting and 
execution process of the FHP? 
The implementation of the Navy’s FRP has not significantly changed the 
budgeting and execution process.  The FRP has changed the shape of the funding profiles 
to match the IDRCs of the FRP, but it has not affected the process for budgeting and 
execution.  
5.  Do further changes to the program’s budgeting models or execution 
methods warrant consideration? 
Budget analysts at both OPNAV 432D and CNAF continue to seek improvements 
to the pricing models used in formulating the FHP budget.  The current models reflect 
both a considerable change, as well as, perceived improvement from those used in 
forecasting funding requirements prior to the FY03 budget year, yet continued refinement 
is necessary.  In the area of AOM accounts, the inclusion of an aging aircraft "demand 
factor" into the FM (consumable) cost per hour equation warrants consideration.  
Additionally, an increased recognition of the expeditionary nature of Marine aviation 
units and the effect this has on FW funding requirements calls for further analysis.  
Though critics remain vocal for continued improvement, the dynamic nature of FHP 
funding precludes ever finding the perfect pricing model.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
The effective management of the FHP continues to pose unique challenges for 
every individual with a vested interest in the program.  The reality of fiscally constrained 
funding within DOD and the inability to accurately budget for every possible operational 
contingency makes the Navy FHP a work in progress.  Additionally, with the ever-
increasing value Naval leadership places on supporting and defending each allocated 
defense dollar, the ability to justify every funding requirement has become a crucial 
measure of effectiveness for the program.  The resulting increase in high-level scrutiny 
and the need to improve the manner in which Naval aviation TYCOMs forecast and 
execute their piece of the defense budget mandated a number of changes.  From the 
incorporation of pricing model changes, to altering execution and procedural methods to 
reflect compliance with the new Fleet Response Plan, the changes commencing in FY03 
allowed the program to emerge with an enhanced level of budgetary accountability.  In 
doing so, the FHP and Naval aviation as a whole now have a firmer foundation from 
which to advocate and defend its programmatic and financial utility as a vital part of  
America's 21st century military. 
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. An analysis into the effects of the FY03 changes to the OP-20 pricing 
models over subsequent budget cycles.  With only two fiscal years to date having 
experienced the effects of the program changes, the lack of sufficient quantitative data 
precludes the drawing of any definitive conclusions from the current study. 
2. Perform a direct comparison between the Navy's FHP budgeting process 
and that utilized by the Air Force.  Incorporating a joint perspective on the funding of 
DOD wide aviation units, while highlighting any recognized strengths or weaknesses, 
may serve to improve the budgeting and execution processes currently employed by each 
of the services. 
3. A study of the execution management of the FHP at the unit level could 
identify effective management techniques for maximizing the readiness achieved for each 
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flight hour flown.  Simply studying the topic could raise awareness and educate managers 
on the importance and benefits of effective FHP management.  If successful, the study 
could lead to the development of a short FHP management course designed to teach 
managers how to improve the efficiency of executing the FHP at the unit level. 
4. Since IPTs are still developing the FO models, a study of the effectiveness 
of the FO models once complete and used for a few years could provide beneficial 
information to improve FHP budget justification. 
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